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The link between crime risk and property prices in England and Wales – Evidence from 
street-level data 
* 
 
[This version December 7th, 2015] 
Abstract: 
This paper uses street-level data on property sales and crime rates for England and Wales to 
investigate compensating differentials for crime risk. My identification strategy relies on the 
use of non-parametric regional time trends on various levels of spatial aggregation as well as 
various fixed effects for streets and wider areas to control for unobserved amenities and 
regional economic conditions. The data comes from transaction data collected by the Land 
Registry and recently published crime maps for the whole of the UK. My estimates, which 
are robust to a range of sensible specification changes, suggest that each case of anti-social 
behavior per 10 population in the same street leads to an approximately 0.6 to 0.8% drop in 
property prices, while a corresponding increase in violent crime decreases prices by roughly 
0.6 to 1.6% and a corresponding increase in non-violent crime by about 0.2 to 0.4%. The 
majority of estimates are at the upper end of these intervals. Estimates for robbery, burglary 
and vehicle crime are either zero or positive, but are possible biased due to reverse causality. 
Crime outside of the respective street does not appear to matter, which is consistent with 
earlier findings. Expressed in monetary terms each case of anti-social behavior costs society 
between £5000 to £6700 and each violent crime between £5000 to £13,300. The results 
                                                          
* All analyses used Stata 13. Do-Files are available from the author on request. All analyses and 
opinions expressed in this paper as well as any possible errors are under the sole responsibility of the 
author. The data is released under Open Government Licence for public sector information 
(http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/). The land registry data 
covers the transactions received at land Registry in the period January 1st, 2011 to December 31st, 
2013 and is covered by Crown copyright. If you have found an error with the data, please contact Her 
Majesty's Land Registry (HMLR). 
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confirm estimates based on prior willingness-to-pay studies and other studies using smaller 
areas such as single cities. 
Keywords: cost of crime; compensating differential; property prices 
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1. Introduction 
A large literature in economics has been concerned with estimating the social cost of 
crime. The most common approach in that literature has been the calculation of compensating 
wage differentials in either wages or property prices as predicted by models by Roback 
(1982, 1988), who also provides some evidence. An alternative approach are willingness to 
pay studies for the avoidance of victimization relying on stated preferences (Ludwig and 
Cook, 2001; Cohen et al., 2004; Atkinson et al., 2005). The logic underlying the former 
approach is that regional amenities or disamenities influence the utility of individuals living 
or working in a region and consequently their willingness to buy a proerty at a certain price 
or to work for a certain wage. Other papers following this approach include, inter alia, 
Gerking and Neirick (1983), Blomquist et al. (1988), Smith (2005), Schmidt and Courant 
(2006) and Braakmann (2009) for wages and Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001), Lynch and 
Rasmussen (2001) and Gibbons (2004) for house prices. A different strand of the literature 
uses similar methods to look at the non-monetary costs of crime such as forced behavioral 
changes (e.g., Hamermesh, 1999; Braakmann, 2012a), effects on well-being (Powdthavee, 
2005) or effects on mental and physical health (Braakmann, 2012b; Dustmann and Fasani, 
2015). 
Most of the earlier literature used larger area crime rates, e.g., city or county crime 
rates. A few notable exceptions are Gibbons (2004), who looks at criminal damage in London 
and Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) who look at the location of sex offenders 
using data from one US county. In contrast, this paper considers a variety of criminal 
offences for the whole of England and Wales using street-level crime data linked with data on 
all property purchases (a total of close to 2 million transactions) from January 2011 to 
December 2013. The property data are available from the land registry and contain 
information on the price paid, the location of the property, specifically the exact address, and 
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some limited information on the property itself such as whether it is newly constructed or 
whether it is a flat or a certain type of house. Using the address information, I combine this 
data with street-level crime data from www.police.uk, a website operated by the British 
police since December 2010 that contains monthly reports on the location of various types of 
crime.1 It is important to be clear that reported crime rates might differ from true crime rates 
due to over- or underreporting. Consequences of this fact for the estimation of compensating 
differentials are discussed in section 3. 
Empirically identifying compensating differentials for crime rates has been proven to 
be challenging for at least two reasons. First, crime rates will generally be correlated with 
other regional factors that are likely to influence crime, some of which might be time-varying 
such as economic conditions2, and some of which might be unobserved, such as changes in 
other regional (dis-)amenities. Second, there is evidence that regional crime rates have an 
influence on the location decisions of businesses (e.g., Cullen and Levitt, 1999; Abadie and 
Dermisi, 2008), which might lead to indirect reverse causality as crime might influence local 
labor market conditions that in turn might influence crime.  
Using street-level data allows me to address the empirical challenges in a relatively 
simple way. First, I am able to use low-level regional fixed effects, roughly on the level of 
neighborhoods or alternatively city quarters, that can be expected to capture most of the 
regional (dis-)amenities that would matter for house prices. These low-level fixed effects are 
likely to capture more unobserved factors than city or county dummies as used in previous 
papers (e.g., Braakmann, 2009). I also use low-level socio-demographic classifications on the 
                                                          
1 Interestingly the daily press suspected early on that the better information about crime that 
the public receives through the publication of these maps might have an effect on house 
prices, e.g., Collins (2011). 
2 For the link between economic conditions and crime see, e.g., Piehl (1998) or Freeman 
(1999) for surveys and Reilly and Witt (1996), Carmichael and Ward (2001), Raphael and 
Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), Edmark (2005) and Braakmann 
(2012c) for recent evidence. 
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postcode level as additional controls and provide some evidence using streets with repeated 
purchases during the observation period, which allows the inclusion of street fixed effects. 
Second, it is important to note that most of the unobserved time-varying factors that influence 
crime will vary on a higher level of aggregation than the street. Labor market conditions, for 
example, will generally vary on the level of the local labor market, which is closer to the city 
rather than to any particular street. To capture these factors I rely on the inclusion of 
city/local authority*month dummies or in some specifications city-quarter*month dummies 
that can be expected to capture most, if not all common time-varying confounders. Third, the 
fact that I use data for just three years (as opposed to several years as in most of the previous 
literature) attenuates remaining concerns regarding reverse causality of the type described 
above, simple because businesses will not have had much time to react to eventual changes in 
crime rates. 
Relying on property prices instead of wages has some further advantages in this 
context: First, the theory of compensating differentials is derived using competitive markets, 
which is generally a debatable assumption for labor markets (see, e.g., Manning 2003, 2011). 
Property markets are in comparison relatively unregulated, which makes it more likely that 
differences in (dis-)amenities show up in prices. Second, while looking at wages always leads 
to concerns regarding selective regional mobility and sorting of workers into regions (see, 
e.g., Braakmann, 2009, section 4.5), properties are generally immobile. 
The previous literature on property prices is relatively sparse and usually based on 
evidence from a single city such as Atlanta (Bowes and Ihlanfeldt, 2001), Jacksonville 
(Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001) or London (Gibbons, 2004) or on data from some other small 
region such as Mecklenburg County in North Carolina (Linden and Rockoff, 2008) or 
Hillsborough County in Florida (Pope, 2008). In contrast this paper uses data for the whole of 
England and Wales, including rural and urban areas. The general conclusion that can be 
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drawn from the literature, regardless of whether the estimates are based on a selection-on-
observables assumption as in Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) or Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) 
or an instrumental variables strategy as in Gibbons (2004), is that crime has a negative effect 
on property prices or values. These effects are found for various types of crime and are 
generally economically large: Bowes and Ihlanfeldt (2001) find a 3–5.7% decrease in 
property prices for one additional crime per acre. Lynch and Rasmussen (2001) find a 4% 
decrease in property prices for a one-standard-deviation increase in violent crimes, and an 
insignificant increase in prices for higher levels of property crime. Finally, in the only other 
study for Europe, Gibbons (2004) results show a 10% decrease in property prices for a one-
standard-deviation increase in criminal damage to property and an insignificant relationship 
with burglary. Finally, two recent studies look at the related but slightly different question 
whether living close to a convicted sex offender reduces property prices (Linden and 
Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008). Both studies find that having a registered sex offender moving 
into a house close by reduces property prices by between 2% (Pope, 2008) and 3 to 4% 
(Linden and Rockoff, 2008). Both studies also find evidence that these effects are very 
localized and quickly decline with distance to the offender.  
These results are broadly confirmed in this paper: Each case of anti-social behavior 
per 10 population in the same street leads to an approximately 0.6 to 0.8% drop in property 
prices, while a corresponding increase in violent crime decreases property prices by roughly 
0.6 to 1.6% and a corresponding increase in other crime by about 0.2 to 0.4%. Estimates for 
robbery, burglary and vehicle crime are either zero or positive, but are possible biased due to 
reverse causality. The majority of estimates using a range of sensible specifications are at the 
upper end of these intervals. Similarly in spirit to results of Pope (2008) and Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) crime in the wider area, e.g., the neighborhood or the city-quarter does not 
seem to have an effect on prices once crimes in the same street are accounted for. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 and 3 describe the data and the 
estimation approach respectively. Results can be found in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
The data used here come from two sources – www.police.uk, a website created by the British 
police that provides monthly street-level information on recorded crimes and the land 
registry, which records all property sales in the UK. The first source was set up by the British 
police in 2010 as part of the open-data initiative of the British government. It provides street-
level maps of recorded criminal offences for each month since December 2010 and also 
allows the download of the underlying data. The prevalence of crime is measured on a 
monthly basis by the counts of recorded offences in several categories, specifically “anti-
social behavior”3, “burglary”, “criminal damage and arson”, “drugs”, “other theft”, “other 
crime”, “public disorder and weapons”, “robbery”, “shoplifting”, “vehicle crime” and 
“violent crime”. Not all of the categories are measured consistently over the observation 
period: “Criminal damage and arson”, “drugs”, “other theft” and “shoplifting” are separate 
categories only since mid-2011 and were part of “other crime” before. “Public disorder and 
weapons” undergoes several changes: Until mid 2011 it was part of “other crime” and from 
mid 2013 it split up into two separate categories, “public disorder” and “possession of 
weapons”. Theft also under goes several changes with “bicycle theft” and “theft from the 
person” being split from “other theft” towards the end of the observation period. Given these 
restrictions, I focus on the following types of crime: “anti-social behavior”, “violent crime”, 
“burglary”, “robbery”, “vehicle crime” and “other crime”, where the latter contains all 
remaining crime categories. 
                                                          
3 The notion of “anti-social behavior” was introduced in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
with some changes being introduced in the 2003 Anti-social Behaviour Act. It basically 
describes acting “in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress 
to one or more persons not of the same household as himself [the perpetrator]” (Part I, 
Chapter 1, Section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). 
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The property data come from the UK land registry, a government department founded 
in 1862 that serves as the central registry for all land owners in England and Wales. The data 
used here is the so-called price paid data4 that has been made publicly available for a number 
of years (currently 1995 onwards). The version used here contains all property sales in 
England and Wales from January 2011 to December 2013. The data contain information on 
the full address of each property, the price paid, the date of transaction, the property type 
(flat, terraced house, semi-detached house or detached house), whether the property is newly 
built and whether the property is freehold or leasehold.  
Both data sets are merged based on a combination of coordinates and UK unit 
postcodes, which are essentially equivalent to streets or parts of streets. In a first step all 
crimes in each month are merged to the nearest postcode based on latitude and longitude, 
where “nearest” means the smallest geodetic distance between the coordinates of the crime 
and the coordinates of the postcode calculated using formulas derived by Vincenty (1975).5 
The crimes are then aggregated to monthly counts in each category per postcode. As 
postcodes differ in population size, I merge this data to postcode population counts from the 
2011 census and calculate crime rates as monthly crimes per 10 population. I also calculate 
two measures of wider-area crime, specifically the crime rates in each category by lower 
layer super output area (LSOA) and by middle layer super output areas (MSOA). Lower and 
middle layer super output areas are spatial units used by the UK census to present data in a 
consistent way over time. Both are relatively small spatial units: According to the Small Area 
Population Estimates by the Office for National Statistics, LSOAs have on average 1600 
inhabitants, while MSOA have an average population of 7700 (as of mid-2010). One can 
think of both as being close to city quarters or – in the case of LSOAs – even smaller 
                                                          
4 See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/price-paid-data.  
5 This uses the Stata ado-file geonear by Robert Picard. 
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neighborhoods. In a second step this postcode-crime data is merged to the property data 
based on the postcode and month. 
I also merge this data with information on the socio-demographic structure of streets, 
specifically the 2011 area classification by the Office for National Statistics (2015). This data 
is based on a variety of variables from the 2011 census and aggregates these to 8 
supergroups, 26 groups and 76 subgroups describing the socio-demographic structure of an 
area. 
In the resulting data set each property sale is one observation with measures of crime 
recorded for the postcode/street where the property is situated and two measures of wider 
area crime, specifically LSOAs and MSOAs. The final sample consists of 1,892,958 
observations.  
(TABLE 1 AROUND HERE.) 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the variables of interest in the the estimation 
sample. Note that both the minimum and maximum price for a property seem rather extreme. 
While both are also plausible – a price of £6950 can easily be the result of an auction sale for 
a (potentially derelict) property starting at £1 and there are houses in the UK, in particular in 
London, that sell for £55m – the robustness of the estimates will be checked on a subsample 
where the top and bottom 1% of all prices have been dropped. Descriptive statistics for this 
subsample can be found in the lower panel of table 1. 
3. Estimation strategy 
I estimate regressions of the form 
ln(piprlt )= Xi’β + ’SDp + τ*cprlt + γ*ċrlt + ηlt + αr + εirlt,     (1) 
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where ln(piprct) is the natural logarithm of the price for property i in postcode p in area r in 
local authority l at time t. Xi contains a set of property characteristics. SDp are dummy 
variables for the 76 area classification subgroups for the respective postcode. cprlt is the crime 
rate for the respective street/postcode in which the property is situated and ċrlt is the wider 
area crime rate, i.e., the crime rate in the same LSOA or MSOA outside of the respective 
street. αr are a set of area fixed effects, depending on the specification either for LSOAs, 
MSOAs or streets/postcodes, and ηlt contains local authority-month fixed effects or in some 
specifications MSOA-month fixed effects. The various fixed effects, essentially dummy 
variables for each area or each area-month combination, control for all observed and 
unobserved factors that are constant within the respective area or area-month. The following 
pages discuss in greater detail how these address various possible biases in the estimation. 
Finally, εirlt is a standard error term. Standard errors are generally clustered on the highest 
area level at which one of the regressors varies, i.e., LSOA for estimations involving street 
and LSOA-level regressors, MSOA if MSOA-level variables are included and so on. In 
practice, the choice of clustering makes very little difference for the statistical significance of 
any of the estimates. 
When trying to estimate compensating property price differentials for crime risk, there 
are three econometric issues that one needs to be worried about. First, crime risk is likely to 
be correlated with a range of other local amenities such as housing quality, the extent and 
quality of public services such as schools, libraries or public transport or the type of persons 
one is likely to get as a neighbor. To the extent that these are time-constant over the period 
studied in this paper, they will be captured by the area fixed effects αr as well as the postcode 
area classification SDp. Note that MSOAs and in particular LSOAs are already fairly small 
spatial units, i.e., it seems likely that most regional (dis-)amenities that matter for individuals’ 
buying decisions will be captured by these fixed effects. Remaining socio-economic 
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differences will, at least partially, be covered by the postcode area classifications that 
aggregate a large number of socio-demographic and economic variables from the 2011 
census. In some robustness checks I also use the fact that 432,603 postcodes have multiple 
purchases either in the same month or at different points in time to include street/postcode 
fixed effects. Note that it is not entirely clear whether these estimates are necessarily better on 
theoretical grounds than the estimates using LSOA or MSOA fixed effects. On the one hand, 
street fixed effects will capture unobserved differences in housing quality or amenities 
between streets in the same wider area. On the other hand, the presence of postcode fixed 
effects means that the estimates use only within-postcode variation in crime over time. As 
houses are durable consumption goods it is not entirely clear whether prospective buyers are 
really influenced by these, somewhat transitory, fluctuations. Estimates using LSOA or 
MSOA fixed effects also include the effects of a property being situated in a “bad” street with 
higher crime rates than the wider area. In this sense, it seems likely that the estimates 
including postcodes are absolute lower bounds for the effects of interest. 
Second, one might be concerned about the influence of the region’s economic 
situation and local labor market conditions. The original Becker (1968) model of crime 
emphasizes the role of legal work opportunities and empirical evidence has been found for a 
link between economic conditions and crime.6 Furthermore, it seems likely that a region’s 
economic conditions will have some impact on property prices, even in the relatively short 
period considered in this paper. When talking about economic conditions, it is important to be 
clear that we would not generally expect economic conditions in the respective street to 
matter. Instead legal work opportunities for someone living in a certain street will be more 
likely determined by the overall economic conditions in the local labor market. These in turn 
                                                          
6 See Piehl (1998) and Freeman (1999) for surveys and Reilly and Witt (1996), Carmichael 
and Ward (2001), Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), 
Edmark (2005) and Braakmann (2012c) for recent evidence. 
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can easily be captured by the region-month effects ηlt. The region-month fixed effects either 
refer to local authorities, which are roughly equal to cities or to larger rural areas or even 
smaller spatial units such as MSOAs (city quarters). Note that estimates based on these two 
specifications are usually very similar indicating that not much of importance is missed by 
the local authority-month effects. These estimates also capture any relevant general trends in 
property prices and/or crime rates in the respective region that might otherwise lead to 
spurious correlation between crime rates and prices, for example if these two variables were 
simply trending similarly. 
Finally, a remaining concern could be direct reverse causality running from the price 
of property i to the risk of property i being affected by crime. This reverse causality could 
potentially be much stronger compared with papers using city-wide crime rates simply 
because a single criminal offence would constitute a much larger relative increase in crime on 
the street than on the city level. The resulting bias will depend on whether certain types of 
crime are more or less likely to occur in streets with more expensive properties. If for 
example, a certain type of crime were more likely to occur in more expensive streets, the 
resulting estimates would be biased upward. As the true causal effect of crime is likely 
negative, i.e., crime risk is a disamenity that lowers property prices, we might find a positive, 
negative or zero effect depending on which effect is stronger. It is important to be clear, 
however, that the area fixed effects and the postcode-level controls will capture many factors 
that could introduce such reverse causality, such as some areas having nice properties, others 
having a flourishing nightlife or yet others being generally deprived. 
The variation used to identify the effects in this paper come from within-area within-
region-month variation in crime rates and property prices. In other words, I exploit the fact 
that in some months some properties that are on the market will experience higher street-level 
crime rates than other properties that go on the market in the same area in either the same or a 
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different month, while taking into account trends in the wider region. 
A common concern with reported crime data is the possibility of measurement error 
due to underreporting of crimes. Additionally, measurement error could also be introduced 
through errors in the matching of crimes to postcodes and properties. Specifically, there are 
the following sources of potential measurement error:  
a) Under- or over-reporting of crime: Essentially, this would mean that reported and 
real crime rates differ. This type of measurement error could cause bias if buyers and sellers 
of properties could observe and act on the true crime rates, while this paper has to rely on 
reported crime. In practice, this is an unlikely scenario as at least buyers are unlikely to 
observe true crime rates and would have to rely on reported crime when deciding abut their 
willingness to pay for a certain property. Even if this type of measurement error mattered, it 
is not obvious that it would be systemically related to property prices, in which case the 
resulting measurement error would lead to attenuation bias towards zero. If this was the case, 
estimates would represent lower bounds for the true effects. 
b) Mismatch of crimes to postcodes: In principle, there are two potential sources of 
measurement error when matching crimes to postcodes. Firstly, the police might record crime 
at the wrong place, for example, by mistyping an address. Secondly, the spatial matching 
procedure matches crimes to the (geographically) nearest postcode, which might not be the 
postcode where the crime occurred. These errors are unlikely to be systematically related to 
house prices and would consequently lead to attenuation bias. They are also less likely to 
affect the estimates for LSOA and MSOA crime rates as these would only be influenced by 
mismatches that place a crime in a different LSOA or MSOA. 
c) Mismatch of house prices to postcodes: 1,892,958 property transactions could be 
successfully matched to postcodes, while matching failed for 205,860 transactions due to 
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missing or non-existent (and likely mistyped) postcodes. Given the existence of mistyped 
postcodes in the land registry data, it is also possible that some properties are matched to the 
wrong postcodes and consequently crime rates. The former type of error would only matter if 
the missing data process was related to property prices, while the latter will essentially 
weaken the relationship between crime rates and property prices and would lead to 
attenuation bias towards zero. 
In sum, in all likelihood measurement error in this case will lead to attenuation bias 
towards zero, essentially allowing for an interpretation of the results as lower bounds for the 
true effects. This measurement error is also more likely to be relevant for the postcode crime 
estimates than for the estimates looking at LSOA or MSOA crime.  
A final question concerns the representativeness of the estimation results. Estimates 
based on property transactions will inevitably have more observations from more active 
property markets. This fact might matter for the estimated overall effect if the crime-property 
price relationship varies systematically across market types, in which case the estimates will 
reflect the situation in higher-volume markets to a greater extent than that in lower-volume 
market. It is important to be clear that while this does not introduce bias in the conventional 
sense of the word, it essentially affects the aggregation of heterogeneous effects to an overall 
effect. Table 2 compares the socio-economic classification of all postcodes, postcodes with 
property purchases and postcodes with multiple transactions. It is clear from the table that 
both transaction samples contain fewer rural postcodes and a higher share of urban and 
suburban postcodes. However, there is a fair share of all postcode types in all samples, 
suggesting that the estimates do not completely miss parts of the picture. 
(TABLE 2 AROUND HERE.) 
4. Results 
 15 
4.1 The impact of crime on house prices 
Consider first the base results displayed in table 3. Column (1) contains the most basic 
estimates excluding property characteristics, which are added in column (2). Column (3) add 
the postcode 2011 area classifications. Columns (4) to (6) then add either LSOA or MSOA 
crime rates or both as additional regressors. The first thing to note is that columns (2) to (6) 
generally show very similar results for the street level crime rates, which suggests that 
postcode-level confounders as well as wider-area crime do not play a large role. For anti-
social behavior, violent crime and other crime, point estimates also have the expected 
(negative) sign and are economically large. For anti-social behavior each additional crime per 
10 population leads to a drop in property prices by approximately 0.8%, while each additional 
violent crime leads to a drop by 1.6%. Effects are smallest for other crime – where reverse 
causality issues are potentially largest – and suggest a 0.4% decrease in property prices per 
additional crime. Expressed in terms of standard deviations the results suggest a roughly 
0.2% decrease in property price for a one standard deviation increase in anti-social behavior, 
a 0.16% decrease for an equivalent increase in violent crime and a 0.1% decrease for non-
violent crime. Effects for burglary and robbery are essentially insignificant and economically 
small, while vehicle crime seems to be positively related to property prices. These estimates 
should be treated somewhat cautiously as reverse causality is likely to be a larger problem 
with these types of property crimes. The second thing to note is that the impact of LSOA or 
MSOA level crime is essentially zero after crimes in the respective street are accounted for. 
All estimates are statistically insignificant with small point estimates and equally small 
standard errors. This finding is very similar to results obtained by Linden and Rockoff (2008) 
and Pope (2008) who find strong drops in prices for properties close to the place of living of 
convicted sex offenders, but find no impact on the prices of properties slightly further away. 
(TABLE 3 AROUND HERE.) 
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Table 4 considers the impact of adding lagged crime rates. We can expect these to 
matter if, for example, prospective property owners look at several months of crime data 
before making buying decisions and if there is sufficient variation over time. Column (1) 
replicates column (3) from table 3 for comparisons, column (2) adds the respective street-
level crime counts lagged by one, two and three months. Other specifications also included 
LSOA and MSOA-level crimes. These were again generally zero and statistically 
insignificant (as in table 3) and are not shown to save space. The evidence suggests that past 
as well as current crimes have a negative impact on property prices, but that this impact 
varies with time. At the same time, the sum of the coefficients on current and lagged crime 
counts is usually similar to or larger in absolute value than the estimates in table 3 and again 
suggests that the latter are probably lower bounds for the total effect of crime on property 
prices. 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.) 
Table 5 explores the robustness of the findings to various changes in the sample and 
the specification. Note that the specifications in each column are identical to the ones in table 
2 except for the respective variation stated. Coefficients for LSOA and MSOA-level crime 
are still zero and are omitted to save space. The first thing one might be concerned about is 
the presence of a few outliers in the price data as mentioned in section 2. Panel (a) of table 5 
re-estimates equation (1) on a sample where observations in the top and bottom 1% of 
property prices have been dropped. Dropping these barely changes the estimates, suggesting 
that outliers do not drive the results.  
(TABLE 5 ABOUND HERE.) 
A second question one might ask is to what extent the city quarter fixed effects 
matter. Panel (b) of table 5 explores this issue by replacing the LSOA fixed effects from table 
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2 with MSOA fixed effects. As we can see the effects are generally very similar to those from 
from table 5, suggesting that confounding effects in the local area do not matter much for the 
results. 
Thirdly, one might be concerned that the local authority-month effects do not capture 
all confounding effects that vary over time, for example gentrification processed that operate 
on the city-quarter level. Panel (c) presents estimates where the local authority-month effects 
have been replaced by MSOA-month effects (in addition to LSOA fixed effects). In these 
specification the effects of MSOA-level crime is no longer identified as it is absorbed by the 
MSOA-month effects, which makes specification (3) and (5) and (4) and (6) identical. More 
importantly, the effects of street-level crime remain again very similar to the estimates in 
table 3 or panel (a). 
Finally, panel (d) provides the strongest test of the link between crime and property 
prices. Firstly, postcode/street-fixed effects replace LSOA-fixed effects and postcode-level 
controls. These can be expected to capture practically all local amenities and other street-
level factors that might matter for both crime and property prices. Secondly, the estimates 
also include MSOA-month effects to allow for small-scale regional changes in 
unobservables. It is important to note again that these estimates are identified using month-to-
month changes in postcode-level crime relative to small-scale regional trends. These 
estimates are also likely to exclude a lot of the variation that prospective property owners 
might be interested in: As properties are durable consumption goods, it is actually less likely 
that prospective owners care much for transitory fluctuations in local crime rates and more 
about whether the street where a property is situated suffers from a permanently higher crime 
count than neighboring streets. As such, it seems likely that these estimates represent absolute 
lower bounds for the effects of interest. However, even these estimates still show the 
expected negative relationship between property prices and most types of crime crime, even 
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though the effect sizes are only about 1/3 of the original estimates and estimates are not 
always statistically significant. These absolute-lower bound effects suggest that each 
additional case of anti-social behavior per 10 population lowers prices by 0.6%, each 
additional violent crime by 0.6% and each additional non-violent crime by 0.2%. 
In total, it appears as if the results are fairly robust to a range of sensible changes in 
the specification: Each case of anti-social behavior per 10 population in a street leads to an 
approximately 0.6 to 0.8% drop in property prices, while a corresponding increase in violent 
crime decreases house prices by roughly 0.6 to 1.6% and a corresponding increase in non-
violent crime by about 0.2 to 0.4%. The majority of estimates are at the upper end of these 
intervals. Compared with the earlier literature these estimates appear to be very similar, but at 
the lower end of the previous findings. Results for burglary, robbery and vehicle crime are 
somewhat counterintuitive, but might potentially be explained by stronger reverse causality 
for these crime.  
4.2 Implied costs of crime 
Percentage changes in property prices through changes in crime rates as those 
presented in the previous section are useful to test the theory of compensating differentials. 
However, cost-benefit-analyses, such as whether it pays to hire an additional policeman who 
prevents X future crimes of a certain type but costs a certain amount of money per annum, 
require a monetary value to be placed on each crime. This section calculates these costs under 
several assumptions. These calculations also enable comparisons with past papers such as 
Gibbons (2004), who uses a similar calculation for property crime, and willingness-to-pay 
studies such as Cohen et al. (2004) for the US or Atkinson et al. (2005) for the UK. Finally, 
these estimated costs provide a sensible plausibility check in terms of the magnitude of the 
effects. Note first that crime affects the value of properties that were sold as well as that of 
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properties that were not sold. At the time of the 2001 census there were 1.75 million unit 
postcodes in England and Wales that cover 27 million delivery points (Office for National 
Statistics, 2004, p. 1). Assuming that each delivery point corresponds to one property, this 
means that there are on average 15 properties per street/postcode. The effects in the previous 
section were calculated based on rates per 10 population. To arrive at an effect per crime, 
these need to be converted to reflect an additional crime in an average street, which had 43 
inhabitants according to the 2011 census. If we are also willing to assume that the average 
price of properties that were sold is equal to that of unsold properties we can get a monetary 
estimate of the cost of each crime as 
% drop in price per crime per 10 population / (average population per street (=43) /10) 
 * avg. property value (=£238,916) * avg. number of properties per street (=15).  (2) 
Note that we do not need to consider properties outside of the respective street as the 
estimates suggest that wider area crime plays no role for property prices. Admittedly, these 
calculations are very approximate as (a) delivery points and properties will not be exactly 
equal and (b) the assumption that the value of sold properties and properties not on the 
market is debatable as the value of sold properties will generally be above the previous 
owner’s reservation price while this may not be true for properties not on the market. 
However, while admittedly being a back-of-the-envelope calculation, it is comparable to the 
calculations made by Gibbons (2004).  
Carrying out these calculations, leads us to implied costs (rounded to the nearest £100) of 
£5000 to £6700 for each case of anti-social behavior, of £5000 to £13,300 for each case of 
violent crime and to £1700 to £3300 for each “other” crime. The respective lower values are 
based on the estimates with street fixed effects and MSOA-month-effects from column (6) in 
panel (d) in table 5 and the respective upper bounds on the base estimates from column (6) in 
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table 3. The estimate for anti-social behavior looks very high relative to violent crime at a 
first glance, but one should keep in mind that the former includes various types of 
harassment, while the latter also includes relatively minor types of violent crimes. 
How do these results compare to the findings from the literature? Cohen et al. (2004) report 
several estimates for people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the avoidance of some types of 
violent crime for the US, specifically a of $70,000 for the avoidance of one serious assault, 
$237,000 for rape and sexual assault and $9.7m for murder. Similarly, Ludwig and Cook 
(2001) end up with an estimate of around £1m per gun-related wounding. Converted to 
Dollar values my estimates for violent crime are substantially lower than the Cohen et al. 
(2004) estimates for serious assault, which seems plausible given that my measures will 
include plenty of less serious cases of violent crime. Atkinson et al. (2005) report WTP 
estimates for common assault, serious wounding and other wounding. Their estimates range 
from a mean WTP of £5,282 for common assault to one of £35,844 for serious wounding. My 
estimates appear to be remarkably similar with the remaining differences potentially due to 
differences in methodology (stated vs. revealed preference) or due to differences in what is 
captured as violent crime. It is plausible, however, that my estimates are dominated by the 
much more frequent less serious cases of violent crime, such as common assault, and less by 
more serious, but less frequent cases such as homicides. 
The best comparison for anti-social behavior is probably Gibbon’s (2004) estimate for 
criminal damage, which is £104,000 per case. Compared with these results the estimates for 
anti-social behavior (and for other types of non-violent crime) seem comparatively low. 
However, Gibbon’s (2004) results are fairly large in comparison with the estimates by 
Atkinson et al. (2005) for much more serious crimes. Furthermore, anti-social behavior, while 
including fairly serious incidents such as harassment, also includes a wide range of “crimes” 
that can be considered to be less severe than criminal damage, such as playing loud music at 
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night or the consumption of alcohol in certain places.  
5. Conclusion 
Based on street level data for property sales and criminal offences, I investigated the 
relationship between property prices and three types of non-property crime, specifically anti-
social behavior, violent crime and drug crime while controlling for unobserved neighborhood 
characteristics and non-parametric regional trends. My estimates, which are robust to a range 
of sensible specification changes, suggest that each case of anti-social behavior per 10 
population in the same street leads to an approximately 0.6 to 0.8% drop in property prices, 
while a corresponding increase in violent crime decreases prices by roughly 0.6 to 1.6% and a 
corresponding increase in non-violent crime by about 0.2 to 0.4%. The majority of estimates 
are at the upper end of these intervals. Estimates for robbery, burglary and vehicle crime are 
either zero or positive, but are possible biased due to reverse causality. Compared with the 
earlier literature these estimates appear to be very similar. Crime outside of the respective 
street does not appear to matter, which is consistent with earlier findings by Linden and 
Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008). It is also consistent with people looking up the postcode of 
a property on the crime maps at www.police.uk. Expressed in monetary terms each case of 
anti-social behavior costs society between £5000 to £6700 and each violent crime between 
£5000 to £13,300. These estimates are roughly in line with previous evidence from both 
stated and revealed preference studies.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price (£) 238,916 283,340 7000 54,959,000 
Ln(price) 12.13 0.65 8.85 17.82 
Crimes per 10 population, street level 
Anti-social 
behavior 
0.03 0.27 0 120 
Burglary 0.01 0.08 0 20 
Robbery 0.00 0.03 0 15 
Vehicle crime 0.01 0.11 0 110 
Violent crime 0.01 0.10 0 40 
Other crime 0.03 0.30 0 140 
Leasehold 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Semi-detached 
house 
0.28 0.45 0 1 
Flat 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Detached house 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Newly built 
house 
0.06 0.23 0 1 
Observations 1,892,958 
Excluding top/bottom 1% of house prices 
Price (£) 222,420 153,818 44,975 1,164,999 
Ln(price) 12.13 0.59 10.71 13.97 
Crimes per 10 population, street level 
Anti-social 
behavior 
0.03 0.27 0 120 
Burglary 0.01 0.08 0 20 
Robbery 0.00 0.03 0 15 
Vehicle crime 0.00 0.07 0 40 
Violent crime 0.01 0.10 0 40 
Other crime 0.03 0.29 0 140 
Leasehold 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Semi-detached 
house 
0.29 0.45 0 1 
Flat 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Detached house 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Newly built 
house 
0.06 0.23 0 1 
Observations 1,855,023 
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Table 2: Socio-demographic characterization of postcodes with (multiple) purchases 
ONS Supergroup 
classification based 
on 2011 census 
Description All postcodes Postcodes with 
property 
transactions 
Postcodes with 
multiple property 
transactions 
1 Rural residents 16.19 14.33 11.43 
2 Cosmopolitans 9.40 4.37 5.21 
3 Ethnicity central 6.50 4.05 4.20 
4 Multicultural 
metropolitans 
10.78 11.42 11.59 
5 Urbanites 18.72 21.95 24.15 
6 Suburbanites 15.78 23.30 24.39 
7 Constrained city 
dwellers 
9.12 4.90 4.30 
8 Hard-pressed 
living 
13.51 15.67 14.73 
Note: The ONS area classification is based on the analysis of a range of variables from the 
2011 census and gives a characterization of the overall population structure of an area. Full 
descriptions of the characteristics of each supergroup can be found in Office for National 
Statistics (2015). 
 28 
Table 3: Crime and house prices, dependent Variable: ln(house price in £) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Street-level 
Anti-social 
behavior 
-0.011*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary 0.027*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0000 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Robbery 0.039* 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Vehicle crime 0.021*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Violent crime -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other crime -0.007** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
LSOA-level 
Anti-social 
behavior 
   0.000  0.000 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Burglary    -0.001**  -0.001** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Robbery    -0.000  -0.001 
    (0.001)  (0.001) 
Vehicle crime    -0.000  0.000 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Violent crime    0.000  0.000 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Other crime    0.000  -0.000 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
MSOA-level 
Anti-social 
behavior 
    -0.000 -0.000* 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Burglary     -0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Robbery     0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Vehicle crime     -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent crime     0.000 0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Other crime     0.000* 0.000* 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Property 
characteristics 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode 
socio-
demographic 
classification  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LSOA fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Local 
authority * 
month fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,892,958 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the respective highest regional 
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aggregation of regressors in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. Property characteristics are dummies for the property being a 
flat, a semi-detached house or a detached house (with terraced house as the base alternative), 
for the property being new and for the property being a leasehold. 
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Table 4: Crime and house prices, lags, dependent Variable: ln(house price in £) 
 (1) (2) 
Not lagged 
Anti-social behavior -0.008*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary -0.000 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Robbery 0.017 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Vehicle crime 0.012** 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
Violent crime -0.016*** -0.009** 
 (0.005) (0.004) 
Other crime -0.004** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Lagged one month 
Anti-social behavior  -0.000 
  (0.002) 
Burglary  -0.004 
  (0.005) 
Robbery  -0.006 
  (0.010) 
Vehicle crime  0.013** 
  (0.006) 
Violent crime  0.001 
  (0.005) 
Other crime  -0.000 
  (0.003) 
Lagged two months 
Anti-social behavior  -0.006** 
  (0.003) 
Burglary  0.006 
  (0.006) 
Robbery  -0.002 
  (0.010) 
Vehicle crime  0.008 
  (0.006) 
Violent crime  -0.009** 
  (0.004) 
Other crime  -0.004 
  (0.002) 
Lagged three months 
Anti-social behavior  -0.001 
  (0.002) 
Burglary  0.004 
  (0.005) 
Robbery  -0.013 
  (0.009) 
Vehicle crime  0.006 
  (0.006) 
Violent crime  -0.010** 
  (0.004) 
Other crime  0.002 
  (0.002) 
N 1,892,958 1,892,958 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the respective highest regional 
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aggregation of regressors in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. Property characteristics are dummies for the property being a 
flat, a semi-detached house or a detached house (with terraced house as the base alternative), 
for the property being new and for the property being a leasehold. 
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Table 5: Robustness checks: Crime and house price, dependent Variable: ln(house price in £) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel (a): Excluding top/bottom 1% of house prices 
Anti-social behavior -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary 0.027*** 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Robbery 0.020 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Vehicle crime 0.013** -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Violent crime -0.024*** -0.015*** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** -0.011** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other crime -0.006** -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1,855,022 
Panel (b): MSOA fixed effects instead of LSOA fixed effects 
Anti-social behavior -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary 0.027*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Robbery 0.039* 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Vehicle crime 0.021*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Violent crime -0.030*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other crime -0.007** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1,892,958 
Panel (c): MSOA*month fixed effects instead of LA*month fixed effects 
Anti-social behavior -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary 0.033*** 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Robbery 0.037** 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Vehicle crime 0.023*** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Violent crime -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Other crime -0.007** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1,892,958 
Panel (d): Postcode fixed effects instead of LSOA-fixed effects, MSOA*month fixed effects instead of LA*month fixed effects 
Anti-social behavior -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Burglary 0.011** 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Robbery 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Vehicle crime 0.013** 0.009* 0.009* 0.008* 0.009* 0.008* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Violent crime -0.013*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Other crime -0.004** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
N 1,185,903 
Property characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Postcode socio-demographic classification  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LSOA fixed effects Panels 
(a) and (c) 
Panels 
(a) and (c) 
Panels 
(a) and (c) 
Panels 
(a) and (c) 
Panels 
(a) and (c) 
Panels 
(a) and (c) 
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Local authority * month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the respective highest regional 
aggregation of regressors in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. Specifications are identical to table 2 except for variation 
stated. LSOA and MSOA-crime levels are generally zero (as in table 2) and are omitted from 
the table. Property characteristics are dummies for the property being a flat, a semi-detached 
house or a detached house (with terraced house as the base alternative), for the property being 
new and for the property being a leasehold. 
